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Death Penalty
by Josh D. Moore*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Between June 1, 2011 and May 31, 2012, the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed several significant points of law in the context of death
penalty litigation. The court grappled with two challenging speedy trial
issues, one constitutional and the other statutory, in Phan v. State1 and
Walker v. State, respectively. The court announced a new rule on the
calculation of time limitations for impeachable convictions in Clay v.
State.3 The court revisited the subject of burden of proof in mental
retardation cases in Stripling v. State.4 And the court articulated a
clear standard for evaluating prejudice in a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial in
Humphrey v. Morrow.5
II.

CASES

In Phan v. State,' the Georgia Supreme Court addressed, on interim
review for the second time, a pretrial case that has been pending in
Gwinnett County since March of 2005.' The claim advanced by Phan
in this appeal was that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had

* Director of Clinical Programs and Special Litigation, Capital Defender Division of the
Georgia Public Defender Standards Council. University of Michigan (A.B., 1991); Harvard
Law School (J.D., 1995).
1. 290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2d 876 (2012) ("PhanIF).
2. 290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012).
3. 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012).
4. 289 Ga. 370, 711 S.E.2d 665 (2011).
5. 289 Ga. 864, 717 S.E.2d 168 (2011).
6. 290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2d 876 (2012).
7. Id. at 588, 723 S.E.2d at 878.
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been violated by pretrial delay attributable to a "'systemic breakdown'
in the public defender system" that essentially left him unrepresented.'
Two lawyers were appointed by the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (GPDSC) to represent Phan, but funding issues came to
a head in 2007 when counsel requested approval for travel to Vietnam
to develop evidence for both phases of trial. In 2009, Phan "filed a
constitutional speedy trial demand and a motion to dismiss for the
State's failure to provide sufficient resources for the defense."9 By April
2009, GPDSC had also stopped paying for attorney fees. The trial court
denied the motions, and the case was certified for interim review.10
The court remanded the case with directions for the trial court to
conduct a full hearing and enter findings on each of the Barker v.
Wingo" factors. 2 The trial court conducted a full hearing pursuant
to the court's directive in 2010 and, upon completion of that hearing,
again denied the motion to dismiss and ordered that Phan's attorneys
"be removed as counsel and that staff attorneys from the capital
defender division [of GPDSCI be 'immediately assigned.""'
At the outset, the court framed the case as one "address[ing] the
consequences of a financially strained indigent defense system operating
within a recession-era [sitate budget." 4 The court ultimately engaged
in a fact-specific analysis of the speedy trial claim and affirmed the trial
court's refusal to dismiss the indictment. 5 The opinion hinged on the
court's weighing of the second Barker v. Wingo factor: "reasons for the
delay."" Under this factor, the court evaluated Phan's claim that the
reason for the delay was a "systemic 'breakdown in the public defender
system'" that ought to weigh against the State. 7 Citing its recent
decision in Weis v. State" (another death penalty interim appeal), the
court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that such a breakdown had not

8. Id. at 590-91, 723 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1286
(2009)).
9. Id. at 590, 723 S.E.2d at 880.
10. Id. at 588-90, 723 S.E.2d at 878-81.
11. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
12. Phan v. State, 287 Ga. 697, 699-700, 699 S.E.2d 9, 11 (2010) ("Phan1"); see Barker,
407 U.S. at 530.
13. Phan II, 290 Ga. at 592, 723 S.E.2d at 880-81.
14. Id. at 588, 723 S.E.2d at 878.
15. Id. at 599, 723 S.E.2d at 885.
16. Id. at 595, 723 S.E.2d at 883.
17. Id. at 594, 723 S.E.2d at 882 (quoting Vermont, 129 S. Ct. at 1286).
18. 287 Ga. 46, 50, 694 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2010).
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occurred because there were other public defender counsel available to
represent Phan.' 9
Phan also raised a claim that "his rights to counsel and due process
[were] violated by the trial court's decision to replace [his counsel of
choice] with staff attorneys from [GPDSC]." 0 The court rejected these
claims, reiterating its earlier pronouncements establishing that a
defendant's choice of appointed counsel can be overridden where
sufficient "countervailing considerations" exist.2' The court distinguished Grant v. State22 (yet another death penalty interim appeal)
where it concluded that "involving local counsel in [the] case was not a
sufficient 'countervailing consideration' to justify removal of defendant's
preferred counsel."2 Here, the court found "compelling 'countervailing
considerations'" insofar as "retaining current counsel would perpetuate
the funding problems that have plagued this case thus far."2' The
court also noted that one of Phan's lawyers "relocated his practice to
Charleston, South Carolina."25 The court concluded this opinion by
noting that it does not "endorse[] ...the system that has led us down
this tortuous path" and offering its "hope that those within the branches
of government empowered to remedy these institutional problems will
make it a priority to do so."26
In Walker v. State,27 the court addressed a statutory speedy trial
claim on interim review. 28 The dispute in this case centered on the
proper interpretation of the language in the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 17-7-171(b) 29 requiring absolute discharge
"[i]f more than two regular terms of court are convened and adjourned
after the term at which the demand for speedy trial is ffled."3' The
court ultimately concluded, contrary to its prior cases, that the language
in question should be construed to mean that three terms of court must
convene and adjourn prior to an acquittal. 31 Accordingly, the court

19. Phan II, 290 Ga. at 595, 723 S.E.2d at 882-83.

20. Id. at 597, 723 S.E.2d at 884.
21. Id. (quoting Weis, 287 Ga. at 50, 694 S.E.2d at 355); see also Davis v. State, 261 Ga.
221, 222, 403 S.E.2d 800, 801 (1991).
22. 278 Ga. 817, 607 S.E.2d 586 (2005).
23. Phan H,290 Ga. at 597-98, 723 S.E.2d at 884 (citing Grant, 278 Ga. at 817, 607
S.E.2d
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

at 587).
Id. at 597, 723 S.E.2d at 884.
Id.
Id. at 598-99, 723 S.E.2d at 885.
290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012).
Id. at 696, 723 S.E.2d at 895.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Walker, 290 Ga. at 698, 723 S.E.2d at 896; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(b).
Walker, 290 Ga. at 701, 723 S.E.2d at 898.
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affirmed the32trial court's denial of Walker's motion to dismiss as
"premature."
The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against
Walker during the third full term of court after she filed her timely
demand for trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171. 3 During the fourth
term, Walker filed a motion for discharge and acquittal, which the trial
court denied as premature based on the fact that the filing of a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty during the third term had the effect of
"reset[ting] the statutory speedy trial clock, which will not start over
'until the convening of the first term following the completion of pretrial
review 4proceedings in the Supreme Court under Code Section 17-10,,
35. 1.

Acknowledging its interpretation to the contrary in previous "dicta" as
well as a tension within the statutory language itself, the court
ultimately concluded that interpreting the statute to mandate discharge
and acquittal after only two terms of court would render the words
"more than" mere surplusage.35 The three-vote concurrence would have
adhered to the court's earlier interpretation that only two terms need be
convened and adjourned to warrant discharge. 36 The concurrence,
however, also noted that Walker's counsel expressed no objection to the
State's motion for continuance during the first term of court "subject to
the fact that we fied a demand for a speedy trial."37 The concurrence
would have affirmed the trial court on the independent ground that this
particular representation by counsel did not constitute "strict compliance" with the statutory requirement of announcing "ready for trial" at
"both terms of court."8
In Clay v. State,39 the court addressed a complicated series of
suppression issues on interim review as well as an issue of first
impression dealing with how to calculate the ten-year period beyond
which a prior conviction becomes presumptively inadmissible for
impeachment purposes pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b). 4 0 Clay
asserted in the trial court that if the prior conviction at issue was more
than ten years old before the time of the testimony to be impeached, the

32. Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 696-97, 723 S.E.2d at 895; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171.
Walker, 290 Ga. at 697, 723 S.E.2d at 895-96; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171(c).
Walker, 290 Ga. at 696, 698, 723 S.E.2d at 895-97.
Id. at 701-02, 723 S.E.2d at 899 (Melton, J., concurring).
Id. at 702-03, 723 S.E.2d at 899.
Id. at 703-04, 723 S.E.2d at 900.
290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012).
Id. at 822, 725 S.E.2d at 263-64; O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b) (2006).
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stricter balancing standard of subsection (b) should apply.4' The State,
on the other hand, contended that the appropriate "end point" for
calculation purposes was "the date of the crimes for which Clay will be
tried in this case." 2 The trial court sided with Clay on this issue and
the supreme court affirmed, "adopt[ing] the date the witness testifies or
the evidence of the prior conviction is introduced as the end point for
determining whether a conviction falls within the ten-year limit
prescribed by [O.C.G.A.] § 24-9-84.1(b)."43
The prior ten-year-old convictions at issue in this particular appeal
were Clay's own convictions that the State sought to introduce against
him in the event that he elected to testify" The trial court found "the
probative value of Clay's prior convictions substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect" despite their age.4"
Clay contended on appeal,
however, that the trial court's failure to enumerate specific factors
supporting this conclusion amounted to an abuse of discretion. 6 The
court agreed and remanded, holding that "a trial court must make an
on-the-record finding of the specific facts and circumstances upon which
it relies in determining that the probative value of a prior conviction
that is more than ten years old substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect ....

47

The suppression issues in the case primarily dealt with a series of four
statements made by Clay to police officers. 4 ' The trial court found,
among other factors, that the Miranda warnings were read to Clay "in
such a 'super-speed' manner that the warnings likely could not have
been identified 'as anything more than gibberish."' 9 The trial court
also concluded that the first three statements were involuntary as a
result of Clay's level of intoxication. Despite the fact that it was
obtained in violation of Clay's Miranda rights, the trial court ruled the
fourth statement admissible based on the fact that it was given
voluntarily. The court reversed on the narrow issue of the admissibility
of this fourth statement, reiterating the general rule that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda are not admissible for any purpose
other than impeachment."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Clay, 290 Ga. at 832, 725 S.E.2d at 270; O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b).
Clay, 290 Ga. at 832, 725 S.E.2d at 270.
Id. at 835, 725 S.E.2d at 272; O.C.GA. § 24-9-84.1(b).
Clay, 290 Ga. at 832, 725 S.E.2d at 270.
Id. at 835, 725 S.E.2d at 272.
Id. at 835-36, 725 S.E.2d at 272.
Id. at 838, 725 S.E.2d at 274.
Id. at 822, 725 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 825, 725 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 827-28, 725 S.E.2d at 267.
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The court also affirmed the trial court's order below suppressing items
of bloody clothing seized from Clay's "personal effects bag" in the
hospital.5 ' The State advanced two theories in support of the seizure
of this evidence: inevitable discovery and plain sight.5 2 The court
ultimately rejected both.5 8 The State's inevitable discovery argument
was that an inventory search of Clay's belongings at his formal arrest
would have revealed the clothing items.54 The court rejected this
argument based on the fact that the State failed to produce any evidence
of "routine inventory procedures for booking searches" and, therefore,
"failed to meet its burden" to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that discovery was inevitable. 55 The court also rejected the
State's plain view argument on the grounds that "all that was in plain
view when [the police] seized the bagged clothing from the counter was
the pink and white personal effects bag itself .... .56

In Stripling v. State,"7 the court grappled with issues framed by a
pending mental retardation retrial and resentencing ordered in
connection with a 1988 crime. 8 The court's focus was on the constitutionality of Georgia's statutory requirement that a defendant establish
his own mental retardation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to be exempted from the death penalty.59 The court ultimately adhered
to its earlier holding in Head v. Hill,6" that such a requirement is, in
fact, constitutional. 6 '
The trial court made three rulings that form the basis of this interim
review. First, the trial court ruled that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard was unconstitutional, and a defendant may only be required to
prove retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.62 This ruling
was reversed.6" Second, the trial court ruled that, despite the fact that
Stripling bore the burden of proof at his retrial on mental retardation,
"the State would make the first opening statement ...

and that the

51. Id. at 830, 725 S.E.2d at 268-69.
52. Id. at 828, 830, 725 S.E.2d at 267, 269.
53. Id. at 830-31, 725 S.E.2d at 269.
54. Id. at 828, 725 S.E.2d at 268.
55. Id. at 830, 725 S.E.2d at 269.
56. Id. at 831, 725 S.E.2d at 269.
57. 289 Ga. 370, 711 S.E.2d 665 (2011).
58. Id. at 370, 711 S.E.2d at 667.
59. Id. at 370-71, 711 S.E.2d at 667-68 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002)).
60. 277 Ga. 255, 262, 587 S.E.2d 613, 622 (2003).
61. Stripling, 289 Ga. at 374, 711 S.E.2d at 669.
62. Id. at 370-71, 289 S.E.2d at 667.
63. Id. at 372-73, 289 S.E.2d at 668.
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State would be entitled to make the first and last of the closing
arguments."" This ruling was affirmed." And third, the trial court
ruled that it "lacked the authority" to consider a plea of guilty but
mentally retarded under the circumstances of this case. 6 The court
found that the trial court did, in fact, have the authority to accept such
a plea, but only to the extent that the State was in agreement with it.67
The court commenced its discussion of the burden of proof question
with the observation that it had "previously addressed this very
issue."68
Although Atkins v. Virginia69 announced a categorical
Eighth Amendment bar to the execution of mentally retarded defendants, the court relied yet again on "the specific statement by the
[United States] Supreme Court that it had not established any
particular procedural standards that must be applied to mental
retardation. " 7O The court also reiterated its characterization of the
heightened burden of proof as a provision that "serve[s] to define the
category of mental retardation within Georgia law."7'
The court noted in passing that the trial court's rejection of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard "relied on a decision by a threejudge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals... that has since
been vacated for rehearing en banc."7 2 The vacated panel decision in
Hill v. Schofield 73 did, in fact, appear to establish that a beyond-areasonable-doubt standard was fundamentally incompatible with the
categorical bar announced in Atkins.74 Several months after the court's
opinion in Stripling, the panel decision in Hill was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc
in Hill v. Humphrey.7 5
The en banc Eleventh Circuit's opinion was explicitly predicated on
the fact that Hill was a case that came before the court for habeas, as
opposed to direct, review. 76 The Eleventh Circuit explained:

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
2010),
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 374, 289 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 375, 289 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 371, 289 S.E.2d at 667.
Id. at 376, 289 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 371, 289 S.E.2d at 668.
536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
Stripling, 289 Ga. at 372, 289 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 373, 289 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 371, 289 S.E.2d at 667 (citing Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.
vacated, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010)).
608 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1283.
662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1361.
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Even if the State of Georgia has somehow inappropriately struck the
balance between two competing interests in § 17-7-131(c)(3), and even
if the Georgia Supreme Court's decision upholding that statute is
considered incorrect or unwise by a federal court, AEDPA [(the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)] precludes a
federal court from imposing its will, invalidating that state statute as
unconstitutional, and granting federal habeas relief in the absence of
"clearly established" federal law, which the United States Supreme
Court admonishes is a holding of that Court. There is no United States
Supreme Court case holding that a reasonable doubt burden of proof
for claims of mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment.
Atkins did not ask or answer that question.77
So, although the United States Supreme Court denied a writ of
certiorari in Hill on June 4, 2012, the Court has not, to date, been called
upon to make a formal pronouncement in a case on direct appeal about
whether or not Georgia's burden of proof is consistent with its decision
in Atkins.7" In other words, although the Georgia Supreme Court here
"reaffirm[ed] that Georgia's statutory definition of mental retardation,
with its requirement that only mental deficiencies capable of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, is not unconstitutional under Atkins,"79 the
possibility remains open that the United States Supreme Court could
ultimately take a different view.
In Humphrey v. Morrow, ° the court reversed a grant of sentencing
relief by a state habeas court on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and reinstated Morrow's death sentence."' On a cross
appeal filed by Morrow, the court affirmed the habeas court's rejection
of Morrow's jury pool composition claims as well as his complaint
regarding the form of his sentencing verdict.8 2
The court rejected the State's contention that prejudice flowing from
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at a death penalty sentencing
should be measured by the same standard as that used for any other
ineffective assistance claim.'
Citing to the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Wiggins v. Smith," the court held that prejudice in
the context of a death penalty sentencing is established where "'there is

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1360; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Hill v. Humphrey, 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012).
Stripling, 289 Ga. at 374, 711 S.E.2d at 669.
289 Ga. 864, 717 S.E.2d 168 (2011).
Id. at 864-65, 717 S.E.2d at 171.
Id.
Id. at 866-67, 717 S.E.2d at 172-73.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a
different balance' in his or her final vote regarding sentencing following
extensive deliberations among the jurors."'
Even under this standard, however, the court remained unpersuaded
by the habeas court's finding that Morrow's counsel failed to discover
and present important mitigating evidence at trial, ultimately concluding that "much of the habeas court's order is simply a recitation of the
same basic life history that was outlined for the jury at trial."' The
court did note new evidence tending to establish that Morrow's sister
was sexually molested by a caretaker but dismissed the significance of
this evidence on the grounds that Morrow's sister "did not tell Morrow
about the abuse until after he was arrested, meaning it could not have
affected his conduct during the murders." 7 The court also noted new
evidence that Morrow himself may have been "raped by his cousin as a
child," but concluded that this evidence "would not have been given great
weight by the jury" because it was ultimately based only on "his own
statement to a psychologist." s8 The court likewise rejected the notion
that the testimony of a new "independent forensic expert" could have
affected the outcome of Morrow's trial, finding both that "the jury would,
like us, favor the testimony of the State's experts" and that, in any
event,
the new expert's "version would not be significantly mitigat,9
ing.

8

The first cross appeal claim addressed by the court related to the
composition of Morrow's grand and traverse jury pools.9 ° The court
affirmed the habeas court's finding that the jury pool composition issues
in this case were "decided adversely to Morrow on direct appeal" and
were therefore barred by res judicata. 91 Although Morrow presented
new evidence in the form of updated U.S. Census data to establish
underrepresentation, the court concluded that this evidence constituted
"merely ... a new means by which the relevant facts might be proven"
as opposed to "new underlying facts" that would justify revisiting the
claim on habeas corpus. 2

85. Morrow, 289 Ga. at 867, 717 S.E.2d at 173 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537).
86.
87.
88.
S.E.2d
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 871-72, 717 S.E.2d at 176.
Id. at 871, 717 S.E.2d at 175.
Id. at 871-72, 717 S.E.2d at 176 (citing Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 565, 668
651, 659 (2008)).
Id. at 870, 874, 717 S.E.2d at 175, 177.
Id. at 875, 717 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 875-76, 717 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 875-76, 717 S.E.2d at 178.
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Another of Morrow's cross appeal claims related to the form of the
jury's sentencing verdict.9" Morrow complained that the verdict in his
case was improper because the verdict form "did not clearly indicate that
the jury had unanimously recommended a death sentence for either of
the two individual murders but, instead, simply found multiple statutory
aggravating circumstances regarding each of the individual murders and
recommended one unified death sentence."94 The court found that this
claim was barred by procedural default.95 Although a showing of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could have overcome this bar,
the court found that the failure to litigate this claim on direct appeal
was not ineffective because the claim had not been preserved by
objection at trial.9" The court then went on to reject the notion that the
failure to preserve this claim was ineffective "because [Morrow] has
failed to show that an objection at trial would have in reasonable
probability led to anything other than the imposition of two death
sentences.9'
In Pierce v. State,98 the court struck an illegal sentence imposed
following a guilty plea that was entered to avoid the death penalty.9 9
Pierce pled guilty to two murders and an aggravated assault and was
sentenced to consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. °0 The court held that because the trial court failed "to make
a specific, express finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt," as required by former O.C.G.A. §02 17-1032.1(b),10 1 Pierce's life without parole sentence could not stand.
The State argued that because O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 had been
repealed 0l " to allow for the imposition of life without the possibility of
parole in all murder cases regardless of whether they involve statutory
aggravating circumstances, a remand would be "an exercise in futility."'" The court disagreed based on the plain language of the statute
05
indicating that the changes were not intended to apply retroactively.

93. Id. at 876-77, 717 S.E.2d at 179.
94. Id. at 876, 717 S.E.2d at 179.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 876-77, 717 S.E.2d at 179.
97. Id. at 877, 717 S.E.2d at 179.

98. 289 Ga. 893, 717 S.E.2d 202 (2011).
99. Id. at 896, 717 S.E.2d at 205.
100. Id. at 893-94, 717 S.E.2d at 203.
101. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (1993).
102. Pierce, 289 Ga. at 896, 717 S.E.2d at 205.
103. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (1993 & Supp. 2012).
104. Pierce,289 Ga. at 896, 717 S.E.2d at 205.

105. Id. at 896, 717 S.E.2d at 205.
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Because Pierce's offense occurred prior to the effective date of the new
law, the court remanded his case for resentencing, noting that the trial
court would be free to consider imposing a sentence of life without parole
on remand so long as it first "finds the existence of at least one
aggravating circumstance." °6
III. CONCLUSION
The court's death penalty jurisprudence did not include review of a
single new death sentence on direct appeal in our sample period. The
interim review cases generated some interesting and significant points
of law but did not announce any new fundamental legal principles
specific to the litigation of death penalty cases in Georgia. The court
continues to express its frustration over complications relating to the
provision of counsel and appropriate resources in death penalty cases.
The court also further stakes out its position on the burden of proof
question in mental retardation cases and, thereby, frames the issue for
possible review in the United States Supreme Court.

106. Id. at 896-97, 717 S.E.2d at 205.

